### Discussion of:

# Market Efficiency in the Age of Big Data

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# FF (2015) factors, cumulative returns

- Each FF(2015)-based strategy's leverage is adjusted to equalize volatilities
  - at  $\sigma = \sigma_{Mkt} = 14.9\%$
- Time period is 1963:07-2008:11


Cumulative Returns, Vol-adjusted, 1963:07:01-2008:10:31  $10^{4}$ Market \$6098 Value Profit Invest Momentum \$1190 103 \$801 \$480 Portfolio Value (\$) 10<sup>2</sup> \$60.19 10<sup>1</sup> 100 1985 2990 1995 2000 2005 2970 1915 1980 1965

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**Empirical Motivation** 

# FF (2015) factors, cumulative returns

• Time period here is 2008:11-2020:08



Empirical Motivation

## Value performance 1926-2020

### 10-year rolling returns – Fama-French "Value" strategy.



# Summary

- In the 45 years leading up to the financial crisis, systematic value factors produced high returns and high SRs.
- In the 12 years since, they have been a disaster.

	1963:07-2008:10			2008:11-2020:08		
	$\overline{R}$	$\sigma$	SR	$\overline{R}$	$\sigma$	SR
Market-R <sub>f</sub>	4.64%	14.9%	0.31	14.28%	20.0%	0.72
Value (HML)	5.45%	7.4%	0.75	-5.55%	11.7%	-0.47
Profit (RMW)	3.63%	5.9%	0.61	1.25%	6.0%	0.26
Invest (CMA)	4.14%	6.0%	0.69	-0.42%	5.1%	-0.08
Mom (UMD)	9.92%	10.0%	0.99	-1.03%	16.4%	-0.06
$R_{f}$	5.53%	_	_	0.48%	_	_

# **Basic Idea**

- Many anomalies were really strong until they were "discovered", and then have "disappeared".
- This could be because:
  - They were never there in the first place
    - e.g., Harvey, Liu, and Zhu (2016), Harvey (2017)
  - 2 Once they were discovered they were, partially or fully, arbitraged away.
    - e.g., McLean and Pontiff (2016).
- This paper instead argues that apparent predictability could result from agents' need to learn the underlying parameters governing the cashflow generating process.
  - Timmermann (1993), Lewellen and Shanken (2002), Collin-Dufresne, Johannes, and Lochstoer (2016, 2017), Johannes, Lochstoer, and Mou (2016)
- This is the first paper I am aware of that explores the effect of learning on cross-sectional anomalies.

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#### Strategy Performance Decline The Model Model Implications

# The Model

- The model features a representative risk-neutral investor who sets prices.
- A key feature of the model is that, to estimate value, the agent needs to estimate cashflow growth rates, which is inherently slow in a noisy environment.
- How well is a new asset (e.g., SPACs) going to perform?
- Value is PV of future dividends **y**<sub>t</sub>
- investors look at a set of predictive variables **X**, and need to estimate **g** in:

$$\mathbf{\Delta}\mathbf{y}_t = \mathbf{X}\mathbf{g} + \mathbf{e}_t$$

Investors have a prior on g

$$\mathbf{g} \sim \mathcal{N}\left(\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{\Sigma}_{g}
ight)$$


and update, using Bayes' rule, based on new cashflow realizations.


- Thus, for of **g** that saw a large update, a characteristic-portfolio will have a high realized return
  - as investor's posterior changes the price changes.



# **Key Findings**

• For reasonable *J*s, the probability of rejecting the null by an econometrician who doesn't understand the learning that is going on his high:





# **Key Findings**

- Persistence: In-sample predictability. No out-of-sample predictability.
  - And, as J grows, the in-sample SR's  $ightarrow\infty.$
- No forward or backward predictability
  - The return predictability in and *past* or *future* time sample is uncorrelated with the predictability in a non-overlapping sample.

# Modeling Declining Anomaly Performance

- I'm going to talk a little about some of the challenges to an explanation of declining anomaly performance based solely on learning.
- This is more than a little unfair, as the authors are not arguing that learning explains all x-sectional anomalies
  - However, I would think that the ultimate objective of this line of research would be to understand how learning, data mining, and arbitrage drive time-variation in anomaly returns.
    - e.g, how could we estimate a nested model with these three features?
  - or perhaps in thinking through issues involved in more concretely modeling learning
    - e.g., is learning faster today than it was pre-information era?

- At least for Value and Momentum, there is fairly strong evidence that effects are consistent across many distinct time periods and asset classes
  - See, e.g., Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2013)
- A batch of fairly recent papers have argued that, not only the premium, but the nature of the time-variation (Daniel and Moskowitz, 2016) is consistent across time periods and geographies:
  - Chabot, Remy, and Jagannathan (2009): "Momentum Trading ..." (UK, 1867-1907)
  - Geczy and Samonov (2015): "Two Centuries ..." (US, 1801-1926)
  - Goetzmann and Huang (2018): "Momentum in Imperial Russia" (Russia, 1865-1914)

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### Discrimiinating between Learning and Arbitrage

- If learning is what is going on, the anomalies should disappear among all stocks at about the same rate.
  - That is, this shouldn't be dependent on arbitrage costs.

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### **Cumulative Returns of Value Portfolios**

### FF-Value Only



Cumulative Returns, 1963:07-2020:09

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### **Cumulative Returns of Value Portfolios**






Cumulative Returns, 1963:07-2020:09

### Inattention? — Intangible Capital

Intangible assets have become increasingly important component of firm value.  $^{1} \ \ \,$ 



Source: O'Shaughnessy Asset Management based on Luminita Enache and Anup Srivastava, "Should Intangible Investments Be Reported Separately or Commingled with Operating Expenses? New Evidence," Management Science, Vol. 64, No. 7, Vuy 2018, 344-5489.

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## Measuring Intangible Captial

- New evidence suggests that markets have not rationally incorporated the value of intangible assets into prices.
  - This is perhaps evidence of slow (ie., not rational Bayesian) learning.

# Measuring Intangible Captial

 Park (2019) follows Peters and Taylor (2017) and each fiscal year t calculates Organizational Capital K<sup>O</sup><sub>t</sub> and Knowledge Capital K<sup>K</sup><sub>t</sub> as:<sup>2</sup>

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{K}_t^O &= (1 - 0.2) \times \mathcal{K}_t^O + 0.3 \times \mathrm{SG\&A}_t \\ \mathcal{K}_t^K &= (1 - \delta^{\mathsf{RD}}) \times \mathcal{K}_t^K + \mathrm{R\&D}_t \end{aligned}$$

where the industry-specific R&D depreciation rate  $\delta^{\rm RD}$  is taken from Li and Hall (2020).

• To calculate the *intangible-Adjusted Book Equity*, iBE, she adds  $K_t^O$  and  $K_t^K$  to standard book-equity (Fama and French, 2015), and subtracts goodwill.

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## intangible-Value Portfolios

#### Intangible-Adjusted Value (iHML), from Park (2019)




Cumulative Returns, 1963:07-2020:09

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# **Bottom Size Decile Firms**

- The improvement in performance is particularly strong in very small firms.
  - again suggesting that limits to arbitrage affects portfolio performance








### Long-short Returns—Bottom Size Decile


 Moreover, for a value-minus-growth portfolio, based on intangible-adjusted-book values, consisting only of bottom-size-decile firms, there has been no decline in performance over the last decade:



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### Fees — Bottom Size Decile Firms

 Indicative fees for bottom-decile iValue and iGrowth firms based on Markit data.



Indicative Fees for small decile extreme-value and growth portfolios

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# **Generalized Learning**

- For asset managers, learning is at least perceived as being really important.
  - Cliff Asness & 2007 quant-crisis: learning about flows
- There is a fascinating analysis in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004):
  - In the late-1990s "technology bubble" hedge funds were long tech stocks.
  - Apparently based (predictable) investor sentiment, they reduced these positions in advance of the collapse in prices starting in March 2004.
  - How did these agents learn about forecasting shifts in sentiment?
- Recent price moves in GME, BTC suggest that this is a difficult problem in some environments!
- A model which integrates learning into an environment with sentiment, conditional on the environment, would be fascinating.

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